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EmploymentIn this paper we analyse macroeconomic consequences of greenhouse gas emission mitigation in Latin America
up to 2050 through a multi-model comparison approach undertaken in the context of the CLIMACAP–LAMP re-
search project. We compare two carbon tax scenarios with a business-as-usual scenario of anticipated future en-
ergy demand. In the short term, with carbon prices reaching around $15/tCO2 by 2030, most models agree that
the reduction in consumer spending, as a proxy for welfare, is limited to about 0.3%. By 2050, at carbon prices
of $165/tCO2, there is much more divergence in the estimated impact on consumer spending as well as GDP
across models and regions, which reﬂects uncertainties about technology costs and substitution opportunities
between technologies. We observe that the consequences of increasingly higher carbon prices, in terms of re-
duced consumer spending and GDP, tend to be fairly linear with the carbon price in our CGE models. However,
the consequences are divergent and nonlinear in our econometric model, that is linked to an energy system
model that simulates step-changes in technology substitution. The results of onemodel show that climate policy
measures can have positive effects on consumer spending and GDP, which results from an investment stimulus
and the redistribution of carbon price revenues to consumers.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
This paper investigates the macroeconomic consequences of green-
house gas (GHG) emission mitigation in Latin America. It is one of a se-
ries of model comparison papers that analyse baseline projections,
technology pathways, land-use change, climate policy, energy supply
investments, and other key aspects of future energy sector development
and climate change mitigation in Latin America (van der Zwaan et al.,
2016a,b). In addition, the series includes country-by-country cross-. This is an open access article undercutting papers emphasising important national circumstances relevant
for climate change mitigation.
Macroeconomics is interrelated to the energy sector and the envi-
ronment in many ways. The particular contribution of this paper is to
offer insights on the range of expected economic consequences of cli-
mate change mitigation in Latin America as a whole as well as in detail
for some of the region's major economies.
This paper ﬁrst sets out the motivation for our work and the ap-
proachwe followed including an overview of the key features and char-
acteristics of the models involved in this analysis (Section 2). Section 3
discusses the model outcomes for the entire region of Latin America
and for three individual countries in particular: Brazil, Mexico and
Colombia. Section 4 highlights our key ﬁndings and conclusions.the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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In its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), as part of Working Group III,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) investigates
the impact of climate change mitigation. In particular, Chapter 6
(Clarke et al., 2014) assesses mitigation pathways and the economic
costs of mitigation action. The evidence presented in AR5 represents
the most comprehensive comparison of recent and relevant modelling
studies and a synthesis of the model comparison literature. IPCC's AR5,
Chapter 6, however, entails no speciﬁc results for Latin American coun-
tries and relatively little discussion of the Latin American region, which
provides a strong motivation for our analysis presented in this paper
The AR5 evidence shows a signiﬁcant variety of model estimates on
the carbon price required to meet different atmospheric emission con-
centrations, aswell as the impact of these carbon prices on gross domes-
tic product (GDP) and consumption. The model results included in AR5
suggest that a carbon price between $15/tCO2 and $200/tCO2 (2010
prices) will be required in 2030 in order to achieve a long-term GHG
concentration of 480–530 ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2e). According to
AR5, this carbon price translates into a GDP loss between 0.2% and 4%.
As the constraint on carbon increases in the scenarios assessed in AR5
over time, the carbon price increases exponentially, leading to the neg-
ative impact on GDP and consumer spending.
The results provided in AR5 reﬂect the energy systemandmacroeco-
nomicmodelling approaches available in the literature at the time of the
IPCC's review. Of the scenarios assessed in AR5, 88 provide results for
Latin America under a global emission concentration of 430–530 ppm
CO2e, and 87 provide results for Latin America under a global emission
concentration of 530–650 ppm CO2e. The results suggest that on aver-
age, mitigation costs in Latin America will be similar to the global aver-
age. However, the range of results is considerable. Some models report
mitigation costs in Latin America being four times the global average,
while others show hardly any mitigation costs for the region. Apart
from the synthesis compiled by the IPCC AR5, macro-economic impacts
of climate change mitigation have been studied for several world re-
gions, including Latin America, by Bowen et al. (2013) and Tavoni
et al. (2013), aswell as for several Latin American countries, for instance
for Brazil (Wills, 2013) and for the Chilean electricity sector (Benavides
et al., 2015). Our study constitutes one of the ﬁrst detailed multi-model
scenario comparison analyses of themacroeconomic costs related to cli-
mate changemitigation in Latin America. Many of themodels applied in
our study have recently been expanded as part of the CLIMACAP–LAMP
project to improve the coverage of Latin American countries.
2.1. Model coverage and scenarios
Seven macro-economic models are involved in our study, with a re-
gional coverage as displayed in Table 1. Themodels' geographical cover-
age allows to compare modelling results for Latin America as a whole
across ﬁve models, for Colombia and Mexico across three models, and
for Brazil across ﬁve models.
To analyse macroeconomic interdependencies of climate change
mitigation, this study focuses on the impact of different carbon prices
relative to the development under a business-as-usual conditions. ATable 1
Regional coverage of the models.
Model Latin
America
Brazil Mexico Colombia Other Latin American
countries/sub-regions
ADAGE ✓ ✓ ✓
E3ME–TIAM–ECN ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
EPPA ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
IMACLIM–BR ✓ ✓
iPETS ✓
MEG4C ✓ ✓
Phoenix ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓set of common scenarios has been deﬁned to frame the overall analysis
for the CLIMACAP–LAMP project, of whichwe apply the following three
scenarios to analyse macroeconomic consequences of carbon prices:
• Core baseline scenario: This business-as-usual scenario, gauged on
baseline assumptions both on the regional and global levels, is used
as the reference for all policy runs.
• Low CO2 price scenario: A CO2 price path scenario starting at $10/
tCO2e1 in 2020 and growing at 4%/year to reach $32/tCO2e by 2050.
• High CO2 price scenario: A CO2 price path scenario starting at $50/
tCO2e in 2020 and growing at 4%/year to reach $162/tCO2e by 2050.
For more detailed descriptions of these scenarios, we refer to van
Ruijven et al. (2016) and Clarke et al. (2016) for the Core baseline sce-
nario and the two climate policy scenarios respectively. Van Ruijven
et al. (2016) also provide detailed information on the model's base
year calibration and the development of the main socio-economic pa-
rameters and energy indicators in the Core baseline scenario.
In accordance with the CLIMACAP–LAMP scenario framework, this
study abstains from harmonising the model's baseline projections as
well as assumptions on GHG abatement pathways and costs across
models, and rather regards different assumptions on future technology
and cost developments representative for the uncertainties of today's
decision makers face (van der Zwaan et al., 2016a). This means for
this analysis that the level of carbon emission abatement under a specif-
ic carbonprice regimevaries acrossmodels.We take this effect into con-
sideration and report the emission reduction2 associated with each
scenario andmodel in the Results section. The strength of this approach
is that the economic impact, which is deﬁned relative to each model's
baseline, can be compared meaningfully across models for each carbon
price scenario.
2.2. Measures of economic cost
Relevant for our study is to identify appropriate measures for the
quantiﬁcation of macroeconomic costs that allow for a comparison of
results across models. Paltsev and Capros (2013) outline alternative
cost concepts for assessing impacts of climate change mitigation policy
that are typically reported in macroeconomic modelling assessments:
• Carbon price
• GDP change
• Consumption change
• Welfare change.
All models applied in our analysis report GDP and consumer spend-
ing as measures of net economic cost. GDP is not a fully satisfactory in-
dicator of cost because it focuses on the production of a country rather
than the impact on consumers and can be distorted by changes in
trade. Consumer spending measures domestic expenditures within a
country and is therefore considered a crude proxy for consumerwelfare.
Although consumer spending only captures market activities and ig-
nores non-market activities (which measures of welfare attempt to in-
clude), consumer spending is a reasonable proxy measure of welfare
except under the following conditions:
1. If households increase their consumption to try to compensate for
change in some circumstances. For example, although households
spend more on heating in a colder year, they are not better off than
during a warmer year.
2. If the increase in spending is ﬁnanced out of savings or by higher bor-
rowing, households are not better off even if spending is higher.1 Unless stated otherwise, monetary units in this article refer to US$(2005).
2 All of the models report CO2 emissions, with the exception of MEG4C which only re-
ports GHG emissions, in CO2e.
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nanced by government borrowing, this can be regarded as house-
holds borrowing from the future (because eventually taxes will
have to be raised).
4. If the increase in spending is ﬁnanced by lower company proﬁts,
householdswill eventually be affected through, for example, a reduc-
tion in the value of wealth held in equities (e.g., through pensions).
Welfare change, the fourthmeasure identiﬁed by Paltsev and Capros
(2013), is not reported by all our models and is also difﬁcult to observe
in reality. Hence, welfare is not included as a measure in our study. The
two main indicators of net economic cost for the paper are therefore
GDP and consumer spending. The changes in GDP and consumer spend-
ing presented in our Results section reﬂect only the costs of reducing
carbon emissions in response to the carbon price signal and thus ignore
the economic impacts of climate change that are expected to occur if
GHG emission concentrations continue to increase. Furthermore, none
of themodels include feedbacks that might arise from co-beneﬁts of cli-
mate changemitigation, such as improved air quality from reduced pol-
lutant emissions.
According to our scenario deﬁnition, carbon prices aremodel inputs,
rather than outputs. By comparing the relative impact of a consistent
carbon price across all models, it is possible to infer some meaning
from the sets of model results without focusing on a comparison of
baselines in each model.
Thus, the indicators compared to represent the total net macroeco-
nomic consequences of climate change mitigation are as follows:
1. The change in GDP relative to the change in carbon emissions: to com-
pare the net impact on economic activity arising from a carbon
price with the net impact on CO2 emissions.
2. The change in carbon emissions relative to the carbon price: to interpret
the emission reduction potential in eachmodel for the stated carbon
price.
3. The change in GDP relative to the carbon price: to interpret and com-
pare the impact of a carbon price on net economic output.
4. The change in consumer spending relative to the carbon price: to inter-
pret and compare the impact of a carbon price on household
consumption.
In addition to these four indicators the Results section contains the
decomposition of the impact on GDP to better understand the differ-
ences between models. Therefore, we consider which components of
GDP—consumer spending, investment, government spending or net
trade (separated to imports and exports, if reported)—aremost affectedTable 2
CGE model characteristics.
Sector
detail
Industry
interactions
Representation of trade
ADAGE 36 Full set of
inter-industry
transactions
Armington with the exception of crude oil,
which is treated as a globally homogenous
good
EPPA 21 Full set of
inter-industry
transactions
Armington speciﬁcation of trade for most
goods except for crude oil and CO2 permits,
which are treated as homogenous goods
IMACLIM–BR 19 Full set of
inter-industry
transactions
Import and export effects are modelled
through elasticities calibrated for Brazil
iPETS 9 Full set of
inter-industry
transactions
Armington
MEG4C 16 Industry is not
disaggregated
in the model
Armington
Phoenix 26 Full set of
inter-industry
transactions
Armington except for crude oil and natural gas,
which are modelled as homogenous goodsin the different models. Hence, for each region, we report and interpret
ﬁve summary model outputs.
2.3. Overview of the models
Six of the seven models of our study belong to the category of com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) models, which explicitly model all
sectors of the economy and their interaction, allowing to inspect both
direct and indirect macro-economic effects related to climate policy.
The remaining model (E3ME–TIAM–ECN) is a detailed macro-
econometric simulation model (E3ME) soft-linked at the sector and
country level with an energy systemmodel (TIAM–ECN). Short summa-
ries of eachmodel are provided in the Supplementarymaterial, while an
overview of key characteristics of our CGEmodels is provided in Table 2.
In the following two subsections we explain some of the main model
features and their general implications on model results from a cross-
model comparison point of view.
2.3.1. Cross-model feature comparison: comparing CGE models
Differences in economic cost across CGE models from imposing a
carbon policy can largely be explained bydifferences in themodel's abil-
ity to substitute to less carbon-intensive energy sources. As discussed in
Clarke et al. (2014), ﬁve categories of model features determine the
model's ability to shift to a less carbon intensive economy. First, models
that capture the entire economic system could have higher economic
cost related to climate policy thanmodelswhich entail a subset only, be-
cause all sectors of the economy and their interactions are captured. On
the other hand, the availability of more low-carbon options is likely
greater in models that span over the whole economic system, which
would contribute to reduce the total economic cost of climate policy.
A second determinant are the expectations in decision making.
Models with myopic decision making (recursive dynamic) are likely
to generate higher policy costs than models with inter-temporal deci-
sion making (perfect foresight) because models that optimise over
time are able to more efﬁciently reduce emissions over the period of
investigation.
Third, models that allow for trade across regions experience lower
policy costs because abatement can occur where it is cheapest. Further,
how models represent trade has implications as well. For instance,
models that assume homogenous goods that trade at one world price
(Heckscher–Ohlin) will have greater ﬂexibility to substitute for less
carbon-intensive goods than models that assume imperfect substitut-
ability between domestic and imported goods (Armington).
Fourth, model assumptions regarding capital mobility have implica-
tions for the cost of carbon policies. The greater the mobility of capital,Number of sectors
traded
Capital and labour market ﬂexibility Foresight
36 Capital vintaging, limited labour and
capital mobility between sectors
Recursive dynamic
21 Capital vintaging in sectors with
long-lived infrastructure; capital and
labour mobile across sectors and regions
Recursive dynamic
19 Mobile capital; labour market: existence
of unemployment and labour supply
represented by a wage curve
Comparative-static
9 Mobile capital and labour Perfect foresight
13 of 16 sectors are
explicitly traded
internationally
Capital is perfectly mobile; two types of
labour: skilled and unskilled; structural
unemployment rate of 10%
Recursive dynamic
26 Capital and labour perfectly mobile Recursive dynamic
3 ADAGE provides results for Brazil separately but not for other Latin American coun-
tries or sub-regions.
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duction with positive impacts on climate policy costs. Some models as-
sume perfect capital mobility, and some models assume capital
vintaging, where a certain portion of the capital stock is assumed to be
ﬁxed to the technology that it was allocated to originally, with little or
no ability to be reallocated.
Lastly, sectoral, regional, and technology detail in themodel also has
implications for policy costs. On the far extreme, models with a single
sector or region assume perfect substitutability across subsectors,
whereas models with greater sectoral or regional detail do not. There-
fore, policy costs could be higher the greater themodel's regional or sec-
toral detail. Models with more technology detail are likely to generate
lower policy costs if a larger pool of available low-carbon technology op-
tions exists.
As displayed in Table 2, most of the CGEmodels in our study capture
the full set of inter-industry transactions, and most represent trade
using the Armington substitution for energy carriers except, in some
cases, for crude oil and natural gas. The biggest difference between the
models is related to the respective assumptions regarding capital and la-
bour mobility with some models assuming limited mobility, and others
assuming perfect mobility.
2.3.2. Cross-model feature comparison: comparing E3ME to the CGEmodels
In terms of basic structure, purpose, and coverage, there are many
similarities between the macro-econometric model E3ME and the CGE
models of this study. Each is a computer-based economic model that
considers energy economy environment (E3) interactions at the global
level, broken down into sectors and world regions. The sectoral disag-
gregation is reasonably similar, although E3ME includes 42 sectors for
non-European economies (69 for European economies) and is therefore
more detailed in structure than the CGE models deployed. Both model-
ling approaches (CGE and macro-econometric) are based on a consis-
tent national accounting framework and make use of similar national
account data.
However, there are substantial differences in modelling approach,
which has important implications on the interpretation of model re-
sults. The two types of model come from distinct economic back-
grounds. Although both are in general consistent in their accounting
and identity balances, they differ substantially in their treatment of be-
havioural relationships. Ultimately, this translates into assumptions
about the economic actor's optimisation. The CGE models describe be-
haviour in linewith economic theory; for example, they assume that in-
dividuals act rationally in their own self-interest and that prices adjust
to market clearing rates. In this way, aggregate demand automatically
adjusts to meet potential supply and output levels are determined by
available capacity. As result of this optimisation assumption, all re-
sources are fully utilised, and it is not possible to increase output and
employment by adding regulation. Behavioural parameters (elastici-
ties) in CGEmodels are the result of either an assumption on optimising
behaviour or modeller judgement informed by the literature. In con-
trast, econometric models like E3ME interrogate historical data sets to
try to determine behavioural factors on an empirical basis. The E3ME
model is demand-driven, with the assumption that supply adjusts
to meet demand (subject to any constraints). Typically, the supply–
demand-equilibrium exists at a level that is likely below maximum
resource capacity, leading to unemployment of available resources.
In consequence, E3ME allows for the possibility of unused capital
and labour resources to be utilised under the right policy conditions
and, hence, additional regulation could lead to increases in invest-
ment, output, and employment.
In E3ME, the elasticities on trade are akin to Armington elasticities,
which are estimated directly from the model time-series data for each
country and sector. An exception to this are commodity markets,
which follow the law of one price. Each of the sectors is able to trade. In-
vestment in capital and the employment of labour are demand driven.
The model solves on an annual basis which corresponds to a recursivedynamic algorithm in CGE terms. In this analysis, E3ME has also been
soft-linked to the TIAM–ECN energy systemmodel in order to enhance
the technology variety within the context of a wider economic model.
3. Results
3.1. Latin America
Five models represent Latin America as an aggregate region. One of
these (iPETS) models Latin America using aggregated data for the re-
gion, and the other four (ADAGE, EPPA, Phoenix and E3ME–TIAM–
ECN) model some individual countries3 as well as a catch-all “rest of
Latin America” region. For these models, the results for Latin America
are an aggregation of the results for the constituent countries and
regions.
Fig. 1 displays for all ﬁvemodels the CO2 prices of the two carbon tax
scenarios and the corresponding CO2 emission reductions versus the
Core baseline emissions at different points in time (2020, 2030, 2040,
and 2050). It can be observed that the levels of the achieved emission
reductions vary across models and scenarios with emission reductions
compared to the Core baseline between 3% and 36% at a CO2 price of
$32/tCO2 in 2050 and between 32% and 71% at a CO2 price of $165/
tCO2 in 2050. For the four CGEmodels, the results are linear and typical-
ly show (mildly) diminishing marginal abatement over time, while the
results for E3ME–TIAM–ECN show signs of increasing marginal abate-
ment in the Low CO2 price scenario. This underlines a difference in the
modelling approaches: it is increasingly difﬁcult to substitute fossil
fuels for clean energy in the CGEmodels, but TIAM–ECN's explicit repre-
sentation of technologymeans that at given carbon prices, a new, previ-
ously uneconomical technology could replace an incumbent technology
at scale. The relationship between carbon price and emission reduction
in TIAM–ECN could therefore be non-linear and depends on the tech-
nologies available to the model which often relate to country-speciﬁc
conditions of the energy system.
Fig. 2 shows the changes of GDP under the existence of carbon pric-
ing compared to the Core baseline versus the achieved CO2 emission re-
ductions, and Fig. 3 illustrates the changes of the consumer spending for
a given CO2 price. In line with the variety of achieved emission reduc-
tions across models and scenarios, considerably different GDP impacts
can be observed. In the Low CO2 price scenario, each of the CGE models
suggests that by 2030, at a carbonprice of around $15/tCO2, emission re-
ductions of between 6% and 20% can be achieved for a reduction in GDP
of between 0.3% and 0.9% and a reduction in consumer spending be-
tween 0.3% and 0.5%.
In the longer term and at higher carbon prices, however, the band-
width of the CGE model results increases, representing more uncertain
about the future impact of carbon pricing. Of the four CGE models,
ADAGE suggests a GDP impact of−3.6% for an emission reduction of
32%; EPPA suggests a GDP impact of nearly−5% for an emission reduc-
tion of 42%; iPETS suggests a GDP impact of−5% for an emission reduc-
tion of 70%; and Phoenix reports a GDP impact of−3% for an emission
reduction of nearly 60%. For these four CGEmodels, the relationship be-
tween GDP and emission reduction is linear and fairly constant within
each scenario.
The E3ME–TIAM–ECN results are starkly different from the CGE
models. Although the reduction in emissions is similar, the change in
GDP and consumer spending is positive. In addition, the E3ME–TIAM–
ECN results are rather non-linear, reﬂecting the possibilities for technol-
ogy substitution at different carbon prices reﬂected by TIAM–ECN. This
difference in outcomes compared to the CGE models emanates from
two counteracting effects in E3ME, which are caused by developments
in the energy system. The structure of the energy economy changes
Fig. 1. Impact on CO2 emissions for a given CO2 price (compared to the Core baseline) in Latin America for the period 2020–2050.
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technologies, which requires increasing investments if climate policy is
introduced. The higher investments in new technologies stimulate the
economy, in particular the demand side, and outweigh economy-
dampening effects emanating from higher energy prices for the period
investigated. However, in the longer term (post 2050), consumers
might still be paying for the investment stimulus that boosted the econ-
omy in earlier periods.
For the relationship between the CO2 price and GDP (Fig. 4) we ﬁnd
two clusters of results among the CGE models, with EPPA and iPETS
showing a similar development at higher negative GDP impacts than
ADAGE and Phoenix. The E3ME–TIAM–ECN model approach diverges
and shows a small but positive GDP impact in the long term.
Fig. 5 shows thedecomposition of theGDP impact for each of theﬁve
models in 2050 in the High CO2 price scenario. For E3ME–TIAM–ECN, an-80%
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ADAGE reports losses to consumer spending from the impact of
higher consumer prices in the High CO2 price scenario compared to
the Core baseline. In consequence, this leads to lower output and
lower investment and hence less government spending because gov-
ernment revenues are reduced. Moreover, exports are reduced follow-
ing an overall loss in cost competitiveness. However, the reduction in
demand for imports offsets this negative export effect in the trade
balance.iPETS
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er spending which declines by up to 3% in 2050 in the High CO2 price
scenario compared to the Core baseline. Reductions in revenues from
exports cannot be outweighed by reduced imports, which results in a
net negative trade impact under the high carbon tax regime until 2050.
Phoenix shows reductions in consumer spending, investment, and
government spending. A small positive GDP impact resulting from
trade can be observed, which suggests that Latin America exhibits a
comparative advantage for some commodities under the High CO2
price scenario. At the sectoral level, Phoenix reports for some of the
Latin American regions an increase in the demand over time for coal, re-
ﬁned coal and oil products, and other heavymanufacturing reliant upon
these energy goods. This result may sound counterintuitive, but al-
though climate policy measures reduce the total demand for coal, re-
gions that have extracted a smaller share of their resource base, as is
the case with some of the Latin America regions relative to other
exporting regions, experience a slower increase in production costs
and prices. Thus, these regions and their trade partners are supplied
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3.2. Brazil
For Brazil, we compare the macroeconomic results of ﬁve models:
four multi-region models (ADAGE, E3ME–TIAM–ECN, EPPA, and
Phoenix) and one single-region Brazil model (IMACLIM–BR).
The upper left panel of Fig. 6 shows the impact on CO2 emission re-
ductions for a given CO2 price in Brazil. When carbon price starts at $50/
tCO2 in 2020, the CO2 emissions are reduced by 11% in E3ME–TIAM–
ECN, 14% in ADAGE and IMACLIM–BR, 16% in EPPA, and 35% in Phoenix
relative to the Core baseline scenario. When carbon price rises to $75/
tCO2 in 2030, the CO2 emission reductions remain stable in ADAGE at
14%, while emission reductions increase modestly in IMACLIM–BR and
EPPA to 18% and 22% respectively. A strong decline of emissions can
be observed for E3ME–TIAM–ECN with a reduction to 26% in 2030 and
in Phoenix where emissions are 41% below the Core baseline scenario
in 2030 in the High CO2 price scenario. By 2050, at carbon prices around0 200
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Fig. 5. Impact on GDP by GDP component in the High CO2 price scenario in Latin America.
631T. Kober et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 625–636$165/tCO2, the CO2 abatement reaches a reduction versus the Core base-
line of 30% in ADAGE, 31% in EPPA, 46% in E3ME TIAM–ECN, and 57% in
Phoenix. E3ME–TIAM–ECNand Phoenix continue to exhibit the greatest
reduction in emissions. The elasticity of CO2 emission abatement and
the details and type of technology that could be applied to reduce emis-
sions are factors that can contribute to the difference of emission reduc-
tion among the CGE models. The change in relative emission reduction
in E3ME–TIAM–ECN from2030 to2050 reﬂects thenonlinear character-
istics of the TIAM–ECN energy system model, because climate change
mitigation is modelled via cost–potential curves, which in total repre-
sent a non-linear relationship. Moreover, higher carbon prices can
make new technologies, which are explicitly deﬁned in TIAM–ECN,-3%
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Fig. 6. Impact of carbon taxes on CO2 emission reductions and related effecviable in economic terms, leading to step changes in the relationship be-
tween CO2 prices and reductions in emissions.
The upper right panel of Fig. 6 shows the impact on GDP relative to
CO2 emission reductions from the Core baseline scenario. The ADAGE
model displays a relatively smaller negative impact on GDP and smaller
carbon abatement in the LowCO2 price scenario than other CGEmodels.
In the High CO2 price scenario ADAGE and EPPA show a nearly identical
pattern by 2050: a 30% reduction in CO2 emissions would lead to a 2.1%
reduction in GDP. The results for the IMACLIM–BRmodel seem to be on
a similar trajectory to the ADAGE results, although the analysis only
goes as far as 2030, at which point the IMACLIM–BR model reports a
1.9% GDP loss for an 18% emission reduction. In stark contrast, Phoenix
suggests that Brazil could reduce carbon emissions by 56% by 2050with
a loss of only 2% of GDP. E3ME–TIAM–ECNexhibits an increase in GDP of
0.7% for a 46% reduction in CO2 emissions.
The negative impact on the economy, asmeasured by GDP, is greater
in EPPA than in ADAGE, IMACLIM–BR, and Phoenix when carbon prices
grow from $50/tCO2 in 2020 at 4% annually (see the lower right panel of
Fig. 6). By 2050, the impact of GDP at a carbon tax of $165/tCO2 reaches
nearly the same level at−2% for all models except E3ME–TIAM–ECN.
Like observed for the whole of Latin America, E3ME–TIAM–ECN shows
a positive GDP impact in Brazil aswell. However, at the lower-price sce-
nario, the ordering of the relationship is different. For prices between
$10 and $20/tCO2, GDP falls by around 1% in IMACLIM–BR, by 0.5% in
EPPA, by 0.25% in Phoenix, and by 0.2% in ADAGE.
The relationship between carbon price and consumer spending, the
component of GDP most closely linked with welfare, is shown in the
lower left panel of Fig. 6. For the consumption metric, Phoenix and
IMACLIM–BR have stronger negative responses to carbon price than
EPPA, while E3ME TIAM ECN and ADAGE show a positive response.-3%
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632 T. Kober et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 625–636For example, at carbon prices of $75/tCO2 in 2030, consumption loss is
between 1% and 1.75% for IMACLIM–BR and Phoenix, and only 0.6%
for EPPA, whereas E3ME–TIAM–ECN and ADAGE see small increases in
consumption of 1% and 0.4% respectively.
Factors such as consumer spending, government spending, invest-
ment, and trade are contributing to the GDP impact, but with different
roles among models (see Fig. 7). Government spending in ADAGE
plays a dominant role in the GDP loss. Despite small losses in GDP and
consumer spending observed on IMACLIM–BR results, investments on
mitigation measures induced by the carbon tax cause a small increase
in overall investments in 2020 and 2030. For EPPA, net trade effects
dominate the outcome, as price effects reduce the competitiveness of
exports and of domestic goods and services relative to imports. By con-
trast, net trade in Phoenix makes a positive contribution to the GDP
impact.
In E3ME–TIAM–ECN, additional investment in the power sector does
not crowd out investment in the rest of the economy. Investment in
productive assets is not constrained in themodel; instead, themodel as-
sumptions implicitly describe a banking systemwhich is able to provide
additional ﬁnancing, potentially (but not necessarily) by withdrawing
from investment in non-productive assets or by further leveraging
against capital assets. However, it is assumed that all investment is
paid for (in full) by consumers and/or businesses, which may in turn
pass on costs to consumers in the form of higher prices.
As a result, the impact on GDP in E3ME–TIAM–ECN is a net effect of
the demand-side stimulus generated by increased real investment, in-
creased prices reducing real consumption, and thenet effects on the bal-
ance of trade. In principle, the positive investment impact could
outweigh the negative price effects reducing real consumer spending
because E3ME–TIAM–ECN allows for spare capacity of production
factors and so demand-side stimulus can yield positive GDP results. Be-
cause many consumer goods are imported, the reduction in consump-
tion leads to a reduction in imports, which also serves to partly offset
the GDP impact (see Fig. 7).
3.3. Mexico
Mexico hasmade remarkable progress in terms of advancing nation-
al climate change policy. Although the country does not have binding
emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol, the country has enacted leg-
islation to reach aggressive emission reductions of 50% by 2050 and ad-
vanced the implementation of economic instruments, including a $5
CO2 tax on some fossil fuels. A comprehensive analysis of the results-5%
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Fig. 7. Impact on GDP by GDP component ifor Mexico, including a policy overview, can be found in Veysey et al.
(2016).
Three models can be compared for Mexico: EPPA, Phoenix, and
E3ME–TIAM–ECN (see Fig. 8). By 2020, for a carbon price of $10/
tCO2e, Phoenix and EPPA ﬁnd a reduction in consumer spending of
0.2% and 0.4%, respectively. As the carbon tax increases, both CGE
models report increasing policy costs in terms of impacts to consump-
tion. In EPPA, consumer spending in the Low CO2 price scenario de-
creases compared to the Core baseline between 1.0% and 1.9% in 2030
and 2050, respectively. Phoenix estimates consumption loss between
0.2% and 0.3% for 2030 and 2050. E3ME–TIAM–ECN shows a positive
impact on consumer spending of around 0.3% in the same years.
In contrast with the relatively modest changes in consumer spend-
ing in the Low CO2 price scenario, the High CO2 price scenario shows a
wide range of possible impacts, both in terms of consumer spending
and in terms of GDP. At a price of $50/tCO2 in 2020, GDP losses in
EPPA and Phoenix are around 2%, while in E3ME–TIAM–ECN, this
price leads to an investment-led economic demand stimulus (see the
upper left panel of Fig. 8). EPPA and Phoenix report an increasing loss
trend as the carbon tax increases further over time, with EPPA ﬁnding
signiﬁcantly higher losses than Phoenix. EPPA results show a total loss
of consumer spending in the High CO2 price scenario of 2% in 2030
and 5% in 2050, while Phoenix results reveal a decline of 1.4% and
2.8% in 2030 and 2050 for the same CO2 price trajectory. Both of the
CGEmodels agree on increasing consumption and GDP losses as carbon
prices increase.
In contrast, consumer spending observed in E3ME–TIAM–ECN in-
creases by 1% at a carbon price of $110/tCO2 in 2040, and decreases
again by 0.5% by 2050. In this model, investment impacts lead to an in-
crease in net economic output, which drives increases in real incomes.
As a result of annualised investment accounting over the technology's
economic lifetime, investments are not necessarily fully paid for by
the end of the modelling period in the form of higher energy prices for
the lifetime of the new capital good, if the lifetime exceeds the model
horizon. This alsomeans that economic costs and beneﬁts do not neces-
sarily take place at the same time.
As explained in Section 3 (and detailed in the Supplementary mate-
rial), EPPA and Phoenix are both recursive dynamic CGE models with
the capability of tracking global trade and energy ﬂows in the economy.
Bothmodels assume similar growth rates (3.2% and 3.3% respectively as
an average for the period 2005–2050) and compare well in their base-
line trajectories. For example, EPPA estimates that Mexico's economy
by 2050 will be $3.6 billion in 2005 U.S. dollars, compared with20
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Fig. 8. Impact of carbon taxes on CO2 emission reductions and related effects on GDP and consumer spending in Mexico for the period 2020–2050.
633T. Kober et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 625–636Phoenix's $3.8 billion estimate. However, the models diverge in total
policy costs. First, the models have differences in baseline projections
in both energy mix and other variables (van der Zwaan et al., 2016b).
Importantly, Phoenix has higher baseline emissions than EPPA and
often shows high abatement levels at lower carbon prices. Several pa-
rameter speciﬁcations can explain these deviations in total policy cost:
• the vintage structure for capital (EPPA includes capital vintage to ac-
count for investment in long-lived assets in some sectors of the econ-
omy, such as the power sector and, to some extent, the reﬁned oil
sector and energy-intensive industries);
• different structures of the production functions for electricity, which
inﬂuences the substitution between different technologies within
the sector;
• detailed CO2 and other GHGs modelling in EPPA, including land-use
changes; and
• speciﬁcations of resource endowments, which affect total oil trade.
In addition, the malleability of capital is an important difference be-
tween the two models. Abandoning investments in the power sector of
infrastructure that has not been depreciated is costly in the EPPAmodel,
reﬂecting the fact that there is a social cost of sunk capital in some in-
dustries. Both models agree on negative impacts from the shift of
trade patterns under a global carbon tax regime because Mexico is an
oil-exporting country that is affected not only by the implementation
of climate policy in the country but also by a global shift to low-
carbon technologies and hence reduced demand for fossil fuels. In sum-
mary, differences in the macroeconomic impacts between models can
be explained by changes in total consumer expenditure resulting from
different prices of energy and other goods and services in the economy,
as well as terms of trade effects, that affect Mexico's oil exports.In the case of E3ME–TIAM–ECN, the long-term positive net impact
on GDP mostly reﬂects two competing factors which are driven by the
changing structure of the energy system. When high carbon taxes are
introduced fuel-intensive technologies are substituted by capital-
intensive technologieswhich provide an investment stimulus. The tech-
nology outcome matters considerably in the determination of the
E3ME–TIAM–ECN results, particularly in the overall cost and the relative
weighting of the capital and operating cost components and the charac-
teristics of those supply chains in the domestic economy. Until 2040, the
investment effects dominate, however, these become less important by
2050 (see Fig. 9). In the High CO2 price scenario, E3ME–TIAM–ECN ex-
periences a negative net trade effect, in particular in the long run with
up to 0.7% (2040) reduction of GDP compared to the Core baseline
scenario.
3.4. Colombia
For Colombia, the implementation of a carbon tax regime may im-
pose macroeconomic costs, as reported by the two CGE models
MEG4C and Phoenix, or positive macroeconomic effects, as shown by
E3ME–TIAM–ECN (Fig. 10). Results from the two CGE models reveal
that Colombia's GDP in 2050 would be between 2.3% and 2.9% lower
compared to the Core baseline scenario if a global carbon tax as high
as $165/tCO2 is implemented. By contrast, E3ME–TIAM–ECN shows
that Colombia's total net GDP impact could be positive, with an increase
of 3.0% in 2050 in the High CO2 price scenario compared to the Core
baseline.
Despite similar MEG4C and Phoenix results on GDP impacts, abate-
ment calculated by each model is very different, as depicted in the
upper left panel of Fig. 10. While MEG4C estimates that emissions
would decrease by 7% by 2050 at a price of $165/tCO2, Phoenix presents
for the same year and carbon price a reduction of almost 60% relative to
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Fig. 9. Impact on GDP by GDP component in the High CO2 price scenario in Mexico.
634 T. Kober et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 625–636the Core baseline scenario. MEG4C's low abatement response is due to
the fact that very few low-carbon technologies are available in the
model, and abatement is mainly achieved through reduced economic
activity instead of adoption of cleaner technologies. On the contrary, ac-
cording to Phoenix, carbon taxes in Colombia achieve high levels of
abatement through a combination of lower economic activity and sub-
stitution towards low-carbon inputs and technologies, which could-80%
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Fig. 10. Impact of carbon taxes on CO2 emission reductions and related effectsinclude the deployment of technologies put forward by in-country re-
searchers (Calderon et al., 2016), such as coal and natural gas technolo-
gy with CO2 capture and storage (CCS) for electricity production after
2035.
In line with the differences between models on the total macroeco-
nomic effect of climate policy, themodels show that consumer spending
could be either reduced in the High CO2 price scenario compared to the-4%
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on GDP and consumer spending in Colombia for the period 2020–2050.
Table 3
Cross-country result comparison for the High CO2 price scenario and for the year 2050.
Latin
America Brazil Mexico Colombia
Number of models 5 5 3 3
CO2 price ($/tCO2) 165.0 165.0 165.0 165.0
Emission change
Average CO2 reduction (%) −50% −41% −47% −45%
Largest CO2 reduction (%) −71% −57% −55% −67%
Minimum CO2 reduction (%) −32% −30% −34% −7%
GDP change
Average GDP change (%) −3% −1% −3% −1%
Maximum decrease in GDP (%) −5% −1% −6% −3%
Maximum increase in GDP (smallest
decrease) (%) 1% −1% 0% 3%
Consumption change
Average consumption change (%) −3% −1% −3% −1%
Maximum decrease in consumption
(%) −5% −3% −5% −4%
Maximum increase in consumption
(smallest decrease) (%) 1% 0% 1% 2%
635T. Kober et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 625–636Core baseline scenario, as observed for Phoenix (−4.1% in 2050) and
MEG4C (−2.2% in 2050) (lower left panel of Fig. 10), or increased, as
seen for E3ME–TIAM–ECN where consumer spending is 2.2% higher in
2050 if the carbon tax regime is introduced. In general, carbon taxes in-
crease the prices of energy and carbon-intensive goods such as trans-
portation, manufacturing, and electricity. Because the level of
substitution between goods is low for private consumption, ﬁnal de-
mand decreases. Phoenix shows the highest impact, which is consistent
with lower elasticity of substitution in private consumption function.
MEG4C projects an increase in consumer spending in 2020 as tax reve-
nues are recycled back to households in the form of transfers, thus stim-
ulating ﬁnal demand; however, the impact of such stimuli fades under
higher carbon prices.
As consumer spending contributes to more than 60% of GDP in both
MEG4C and Phoenix, the impact of carbon tax on consumption drives
most impacts on total output in the High CO2 scenario (see Fig. 11).
However, in both CGE models, investment also declines as a result of
lower levels of savings in response to dampened economic activity.
The opposite dynamic can be observed for the E3ME–TIAM–ECN
modelwhich shows an investment stimulation, outweighing the impact
of higher prices under climate policy. Higher investments in the High
CO2 price scenario compared to the Core baseline and no crowding-
out of long-term full employment lead to growing real incomes and in-
creased consumer spending.
In terms of international trade, Phoenix presents a changing pattern
of net trade impacts over time. Compared to the Core baseline a nega-
tive impact on net exports is induced in the High CO2 price scenario in
2020 and 2030 whereas in 2040 and 2050 net export impacts become
positive. For the period until 2030, a signiﬁcant impact emanates from
reduced exports of fossil fuels under the carbon tax scenario, in particu-
lar coal, which declines in this period by 40–50% compared to the Core
baseline. In 2040 and 2050, however, Colombia's coal exports in the
High CO2 price scenario increase the export levels of the Core baseline
as trade partners increase the use of CCS in electricity generation.
Under the climate policy scenario, total cumulative coal production is
lower as well as extraction costs. Therefore, coal is less expensive in re-
lation to the Core baseline scenario. Lower-priced coal makes coal-
intensive industries, like iron and steel production, more competitive,
which drives a slight increase in iron and steel exports as well, deepen-
ing the positive long-term effect on net exports in the High CO2 price
scenario. In E3ME–TIAM–ECN, increasing imports and decreasing ex-
ports in theHigh CO2 price scenario compared to the Core baseline part-
ly offset the positive impacts on investment and consumer spending. In
this regard, shifts in coal trade support this development with 40% re-
duction of Colombian exports over the period 2020 to 2050 in the
High CO2 price scenario compared to the Core baseline.-4%
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Fig. 11. Impact on GDP by GDP component in the High CO2 price scenario Ein Colombia in
2050.3.5. Cross country comparison
By comparing the model results across regions, some common ob-
servations can be made as displayed in Table 3 for the High CO2 price
scenario.
For the Latin America as a whole and its two largest economies,
Brazil and Mexico, the following conclusions can be drawn:
• An emission reduction of between 30% and 70%, with a simple
average of between 40 and 50%, is expected by 2050 at carbon prices
of $165/tCO2.
• The impact on GDP through an ambitious CO2 price regime and
recycling the revenues back to consumers is expected to be between
−6% and +1% by 2050.
• This is equivalent to reducing the annual average GDP growth rate by
between−0.08 and 0.04 percentage points (pp).
• The impact on consumer spending is expected to range between−5%
and +1% by 2050.
For Colombia, the economic impacts of CO2 pricing are broadly in
line with those of the other countries modelled. The range of results in
terms of achieved emission reductions, however, is much wider (7% to
67% by 2050), which reﬂects uncertainties regarding Colombia's techni-
cal capabilities to reduce GHG emissions.
4. Conclusions
This paper presents a ﬁrst detailed multi-model scenario compari-
son analysis of the macroeconomic costs of decarbonising the Latin
American economy through carbon pricing. The scenarios that we
inspected can only be considered as illustrative: CO2 pricing and simple
redistribution of CO2 price revenues to consumers deﬁne the scenarios
to simplify the model comparison exercise. A more in-depth analysis
of individual countries and regions, and country-speciﬁc policy tools,
such as regulation, ﬁscal instruments, national revenue recycling
schemes and trade policy, could provide more policy-relevant out-
comes, but at the cost of consistency across models.
The following key ﬁndings have emerged:
• In the short term, if carbon prices reach around $15/tCO2 by 2030, our
CGE models agree that the reduction in consumer spending (as proxy
for welfare) is limited in all Latin American countries that we
modelled as well as across the continent (between 0.1% and 1%,
with an average of 0.3%).
636 T. Kober et al. / Energy Economics 56 (2016) 625–636• By 2050, at carbon prices of $165/tCO2, there ismuchmore divergence
in the estimated impact on GDP and consumer spending across
models and regions, which reﬂects uncertainties about technology
costs and substitution opportunities between technologies
• In the E3ME–TIAM–ECN approach, the impact of carbon pricing on
consumption and GDP can be positive because the investment stimu-
lus (in new technology required to reduce carbon emissions) and the
redistribution of carbon price revenues to consumers outweighs the
consumption losses as a result of higher prices.
• Consumer spending and GDP decrease fairly linearly with growing
CO2 prices in the CGE models, whereas the opposite dynamic can be
observed for the E3ME–TIAM–ECNmodel with a rather non-linear re-
lationship. This non-linearity results from step-changes in technology
substitution in TIAM–ECN and the impact of each technology (its cost,
cost composition and supply chain implications) as represented in
E3ME.
The ﬁnding that the macroeconomic cost of abatement can vary
acrossmodels is consistentwith the IPCC report ﬁnding that differences
in economic cost across CGE models from imposing a carbon policy can
largely be explained by differences in themodel's ability to substitute to
less carbon-intensive energy sources (Clarke et al., 2014). Comparing
our results on GDP impacts in Latin America with the ﬁndings of the
IPCC AR5, which reports GDP loss on the global level, reveals that the
minor GDP impacts we observe under moderate carbon taxes in the
mid-term are in line with the median of cross-model results of about
0.3% GDP loss in 2030 under a carbon price of around $20/tCO2
(Clarke et al., 2014). For the year 2050, the IPCC AR5 shows a range4
for global GDP loss between 1.5% and 3% at a carbon price range of
about $80–200/tCO2 (Clarke et al., 2014). In comparison, the GDP im-
pacts as determined in our analysis for Latin America under a carbon
tax of $165/tCO2 in 2050 ranges from−5% to 1% across all models. Rea-
sons for this difference to IPCC can be manifold, such as the inclusion of
regional particularities or differences in the methodology to determine
GDP impacts. For themodels involved in our study, we ﬁnd that in com-
parison to the CGE models, the E3ME–TIAM–ECN model largely yields
divergent macroeconomic impacts because of fundamental differences
in economic structure and model approach that allow policy interven-
tion that stimulates the demand side to lead to positive impacts on
GDP. The outcome in E3ME–TIAM–ECN that consumer spending could
be increased suggests that the price inﬂuences resulting from more-
expensive (low carbon) energy do not outweigh the macroeconomic
impacts induced by structural changes to the energy system.
Overall, the model results suggest that countries in Latin American
can expect to see limited impacts on consumer spending and GDP in
the medium term with carbon prices of around $15/tCO2. For the long
term perspective, modelling results present a modest range of the po-
tential macro-economic impact of carbon taxes up to $165/tCO2.
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